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there is no language in the decision to militate against wifely recovery were a proper case to be submitted for consideration.
At present, this area of damage and tort law is typified by
many cases denying recovery to the wife, citing voluminous authority, and a few cases granting such recovery, with a reevaluation
of these principles of law. There are also New York and California.
It appears that to achieve clarity in this field and to obtain equality
of legal status for the wife, recognition of her right may have to
come by way of legislative action. It is felt, however, that justice
will be better served in this area when the courts free themselves
from the intellectually inhibiting remnants and pristine legalistics of
the medieval common law and recognize the basic rights of all
humanity in its most intimate relationship.
Orton Alan Jones
Income Tax - Jurisdiction of Federal District Court to Grant
Refund of Partial Income Tax Payment
P, for the taxable year 1950, reported certain losses as ordinary
losses. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue treated them as
capital losses and levied a deficiency assessment in the amount
of $28,908.60. P paid $5058.54 and then filed a claim with the
Commissioner for refund of that amount. The claim was disallowed and P sued for refund in the District Court. The District Court
stated that the P "should not maintain the action because he had not
paid the full amount of the assessment", but still entered judgment
in favor of the Government. The Court of Appeals of the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the District Court upon the jurisdictional issue,
and remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and dismiss
the complaint. The United States Supreme Court affirmed in 1959.
Held, affirmed on re-hearing. The statute giving district courts
jurisdiction of any civil action against the United States for recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under internalrevenue laws, considered -in the light of the language used therein
and the legislative history of the statute and the historical background and the harmony of the statutory system of tax litigation
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and the uniformity of the pre-1940 judicial belief that full payment
had to precede suit, must be construed as requiring full payment
of the assessment before an income tax refund suit can be maintained in federal District Court. Flora v. United States, 80 Sup.
Ct. 630 (1960).
It has been the established policy of our system of tax litigation that the taxpayer must first pay the entire tax assessed against
him before bringing suit for its recovery. United States v. Jefferson
Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386 (1933); Cheatham v. United States,
92 U.S. 85 (1875); Suhr v. United States, 18 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.
1927).
This established policy seems to have suffered its first setback in Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 609 (1940), where the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit held that payment of remaining installments of income tax need not be made as a "condition precedent" to institution of an action to recover over-payments
in the District Court. The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit
further chipped away at this precedent by holding in Sirian Lamp
Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (1941), that a taxpayer could bring
suit to recover partial payment of a deficiency assessment before
such assessment was paid in full. The same conclusion was reached
in Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F.2d 146 (1956), where the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit held that under
Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (1) (1952), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (1) (Supp. V, 1958), hereinafter referred to as Section 1346 (a) (1), payment of a portion of additionally assessed income taxes would allow the taxpayer to bring
an action against the United States in federal District Court to recover taxes paid and test the validity of the additional assessment.
Section 1346 (a) (1), supra, provides that the District Court
shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of:
"(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery
of any internal-revenue tax alleged -to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive
or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue
laws

*

* *."

The majority in the principal case feel, contrary to the expressed opinion of the court in the Bushmiaer case, supra, that the
words of the statute are not clear and unambiguous, but that the
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words "any sum", rather than referring to a part or portion of the
"any internal-revenue tax" or "any penalty", may refer to amounts
which are neither "taxes" nor "penalties" but interest. These same
words have been similarly interpreted in several lower court decisions. United States v. Magoon, 77 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935);
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 70 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1934);
United States v. Clarke, 69 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1934).

By relying on statutory interpretation alone, it would indeed
be difficult to decide which view is better on its merits. The Supreme
Court observed, quite candidly in the principal case, that "we are
not here concerned with a single sentence in an isolated statute, but
rather with a jurisdictional provision which is a keystone in a carefully articulated and quite complicated structure of tax laws." A
more determinitive factor than mere conjecture regarding statutory
construction can be considered in determining which party litigant
has presented a more acceptable proposal.
That factor which seems to make the majority decision in
this case a more feasible one is that in 1924 the Board of Tax
Appeals, now known as the Tax Court, was established by congressional legislation in the form of Revenue Act of 1924, § 900
(a), 43 Stat. 235, 336. The House Committee, in its report on
the bill, indicated that the right of appeal after payment of an
additional assessment of income tax was an incomplete remedy
and was one that did little to remove the hardship occasioned by
an incorrect assessment. The establishment of the Board of Tax
Appeals would allow the taxpayer a means for determining his
tax liability prior to its payment. H.R. Res. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 7 (1924).
The basic requirement for any orderly system of law enforcement is an organized means by which to enforce the law. The
establishment of the Tax Court, we have seen, has given the taxpayer a tribunal for litigation prior to payment of any deficiency
assessment. Respect for the rules of good order dictates that such
a forum, seemingly created expressly for the purpose of prepayment
litigation, should not arbitrarily be circumvented. Once a deficiency
has been determined by the Tax Court, the taxpayer may stay
assessment and collection of such deficiency by giving a bond to
secure payment and appeal the adverse determination to the Circuit
Court of Appeals of his respective circuit. Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589 (1931). If he does not wish to follow this course
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of action, it is his privilege to engage in litigation at one of two
other levels, the District Court or the Court of Claims. United
States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., supra. The prerequisite for entering the District Court to gain a refund, must, in and of itself,
be payment of the entire deficiency assessment. For, if one can
request a refund of a partially paid assessment in the District Court,
of what value would the Tax Court be, either to the taxpayer or
the government? Payment of a mere nominal sum to the Commissioner would gain for each and every taxpayer the right to enter
a District Court and debate the merits of the deficiency assessment
in that forum. This would defeat the basic purpose for establishment of our Tax Court, and hence one should not be permitted,
prior to payment of his entire deficiency assessment, to litigate
his case in the District Court, but instead should be made to find
his remedy in the Tax Court, and if adverse, to appeal in the Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in this case
is one of great insight and one which is indeed basic to the continued existence of our present system of tax litigation.
Aaron David Trub

Legal Ethics

-

Attorneys -

Disbarment While Serving as Judge

Petitioners sought disbarment of defendant, an attorney and
judge, because of numerous alleged acts of wilful, deceitful, unlawful and immoral conduct, both in his individual and official capacities. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds
(1) that defendant, being a judge and constitutional officer, could
be removed from office only by impeachment and (2) that the
statute relating to disbarment of attorneys was not applicable. The
Court of Appeals was equally divided on the question presented
and the case came to the Supreme Court of Georgia for review.
Held, reversed. The facts that a judge of the superior court is a
constitutional officer, must be a lawyer with seven years' experience,
may not practice law while serving as judge, and may be removed
from office by impeachment, constitute no reasons for disallowing
proceedings to disbar him as an attorney. Gordon v. Clinkscales,
114 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. 1960).
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